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Reasonable Expectations in Families,
Businesses, and Family Businesses: A
Comment on Rollockt
TERRY A. O'NEILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am happy to have the opportunity to comment on Alysa Rollock's article,
Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family Business: The
Lawyer as Intermediary.' In her article, Professor Rollock makes a much-needed
contribution to the literature on lawyers' responsibilities when forming a
business enterprise. As she observes, the guidelines provided by Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 2.22 do not answer all of the questions,3 and indeed some
of the questions left unanswered by the Rule are crucial to the lawyer's
intermediary role.
Rollock's salient contribution is to establish a framework-her "reasonable
expectations" approach-within which the lawyer can ascertain, first and
foremost, who her clients are, and in the process of doing that, help them to
articulate their own understandings of the reciprocal rights and responsibilities
with respect to their family's business.
From my perspective as a corporate lawyer, being asked to comment on
Rollock's article has allowed me to reflect on my own experiences in
representing family businesses. Reading her article led me to think back on the
interactions, dependencies, trust, and expectations in the family businesses I
represented. Those businesses were peopled by wives, husbands, in-laws,
cousins, grandparents, parents, sons, and daughters. Though the degree to which
family members participated in the businesses varied dramatically, all of the
family members surely harbored expectations about their families' businesses.
Just as surely, as I think back, they did not all necessarily share their expectations
with me or my colleagues at the law firm. Perhaps they thought it was not
necessary. Perhaps we thought we understood what they wanted after talking
with their relatives. In retrospect, those assumptions may have been warranted
in some cases, but erroneous in others. Professor Rollock has done all of us a
great service by showing us how important it is to get family members to ponder
what their expectations are, so that their own roles, as well as that of the lawyer
intermediary, can be clarified.
t © 1998 by Terry A. O'Neill.
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; B.A., 1974, Northwestern University;
J.D., 1980, Tulane Law School.
I. Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family
Business, 73 IND. L.J. 567 (1998).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2.2 (1995).
3. See Rollock, supra note 1, at 580. For a thoroughgoing critique of Model Rule 2.2, see
John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in
the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741.
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At the same time, from my perspective as a feminist, commenting on this
article has allowed me to take my thoughts in another direction. I have found
myself thinking that the idea of a "family business" is something of an
oxymoron. The terms "family" and "business" don't seem to belong together.
Certainly, the practice areas of "family law" and "business law" do not seem to
fit together. A family-law practice involves highly emotionally charged issues,
such as divorce, child custody, or adoption. By contrast, a business-law practice
may be thought of as involving purely intellectual exercises, such as negotiating
a purchase or sale of assets, or arrangirig financing for the transaction. To state
the contrast more starkly, it might be said that business law entails rationality,
clarity, hard-headed bargaining from self-interest, and cold-eyed calculation of
risk, while family law entails emotionality (including anger as well as love),
dependence, and altruistic self-sacrifice.
This polarized understanding of what it means to practice "family law" as
opposed to "business law" reflects what feminist scholars have critiqued as the
"family/market dichotomy," which describes a strict, and strictly gendered,
division between the masculine sphere of commerce, rationality, and calculation,
and the feminine sphere of family, emotion, and trust.4 The family/market
dichotomy is factually distorted, but nonetheless ideologically powerful. It is
factually distorted in that there is a significant measure of emotionality and trust
in every commercial relationship, just as there is a significant measure of self-
protection and calculation in every family relationship s But that is mere factual
reality. The far more powerful myth is that, in commercial relations, everyone is
strictly out for himself while, in families, everyone sacrifices his own personal
welfare for the good of the group.6 For some, moreover, this myth is not only
descriptive, but also normative. Oliver Williamson, for example, has called for
the concept of "trust" to be abolished from analyses of commercial relations,
arguing that trust should be relegated to the sphere of family and other purely
personal relationships.7
4. The leading work on the false dichotomy between family and market is Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497 (1983). Recent discussions of this dichotomy include Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue
Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997) (discussing the impact of family/market dichotomy on
disputes over validity of bequests to nonrelatives), and Radhika Ran, Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HAsTINGS L.J. 951, 963-64 (1996)
(observing that assisted reproductive technology exposes the falsity of the family/market
dichotomy because through it families are "assembled by means of arms-length transactions
between individuals who purchase and sell the raw materials with which to produce a child").
5. See Olsen, supra note 4, at 1565-66. I have explored this issue previously, in Terry A.
O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested
Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L.
REv. 646 (1992).
6. See Olsen, supra note 4, at 1505.
7. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 453 (1993). I critiqued this argument from a feminist perspective in Trust is for Girls,
a paper I presented at the Annual Conference for the Society for the Advancement of Socio-
Economics in 1996. See Terry A. O'Neill, Trust is for Girls (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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A striking example of how the family/market dichotomy operates can be seen
in a recent Second Circuit decision involving a quasi-family business. The case
was United States v. Chestman,' an insider-trading case involving the sale of
Waldbaum's to A&P. Though publicly traded, Waldbaum's was still controlled
by its founding family; its president and controlling shareholder was Ira
Waldbaum, the family patriarch.9 Ira's niece Susan told her husband, Keith,
about A&P's imminent purchase of Waldbaum's, but warned him not to tell
anyone else. Keith betrayed his wife's confidence by tipping his stockbroker to
the impending deal, and the stockbroker was prosecuted for insider trading.'0 A
key issue in Chestman was whether Keith had breached a fiduciary duty to his
wife when he took the information she revealed to him and used it for his own
purposes." The Second Circuit ruled that he owed no such duty to her because
their relationship was marital, thus not fiduciary in nature.' 2 In critiquing this
case, Professor Judith Greenberg has observed that the court's conclusion "is
belied both by the facts which show a relationship of dependence and reliance
[between the spouses], and by a line of family law cases which frequently find
that marriage creates a confidential relationship."' 3 In other words, the court
strained both the facts before it and relevant legal precedent in order to maintain
the ideology of opposition between familial relations and corporate relations.' 4
The family business reveals the artificiality of the family/market dichotomy.
It stands as a factual counterstory to ideological efforts at segregating the
concept of business, and all it entails, from the concept of the family, and all it
entails. This counterfactual reality should make us wonder about the ideology
that produced the family/market dichotomy in the first place. From this
perspective, Rollock's article provides an opportunity to reflect on what sorts of
relations are possible, and what are desirable, within a family business, and what
the role of the family-business lawyer is in fostering such relations. It also allows
us to reflect on the possibilities for transcending the family/market dichotomy
and for working toward social relations unburdened by false dichotomies.
II. THE REASONABLE-EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF
INTERMEDIATION
Rollock's central insight is that, too often, lawyers overlook the fact that
individual members within families may have separate, divergent, or even
8. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
9. See id at 555, 570.
10. See id at 555-56.
11. See id. at 565-71.
12. See id at 568.
13. Judith G. Greenberg, Insider Trading and Family Values, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. (forthcoming Spring 1998) (manuscript pt. 3, at 4, on file with author).
14. Greenberg suggests, further: "An analysis of Chestman shows the importance of
maintaining a clear line between market and family. Were this line to disappear, the distinction
between family and market might be blurred, upsetting our notions of how to act in each realm,
and thus, of gender roles." Id (manuscript pt. 3, at 1).
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directly conflicting interests with respect to their family businesses." Rollock
argues that this oversight is not consonant with the requirements of Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 2.2, as she interprets those provisions. Under
her interpretation, the lawyer must clarify from the very outset of the
representation which family members are to be represented and which are not.
Importantly, however, the lawyer's ethical obligation does not end with
ascertaining who the clients are. The lawyer must then notify the unrepresented
family member(s) that she is not acting on their behalf, and that they should
consider hiring their own lawyer. 6
Rollock's interpretation of Model Rule 2.2 flows from her "reasonable
expectations" model of the Model Rule's requirements. This model affirms both
communitarian and individualist aspects of families. Indeed, I read her article as
calling for a balancing of these two ethics-community and individual
autonomy-within family businesses. In arriving at the reasonable-expectations
approach, Rollock first considers both a communitarian approach and a
contractualist approach to family-business intermediation. Ultimately she rejects
both as unrealistic, and crafts the reasonable-expectations approach as a middle
ground between the other alternatives. 7
The communitarian approach to family representation calls on the lawyer to
represent the family as a unitary entity, as opposed to undertaking a joint
representation of individual family members. 8 Because the family, as an entity
15. See Rollock, supra note 1, at 572-73.
16. See id. at 585-86.
17. See id. at 584-86.
18. The most intense advocate of the communitarian view is Thomas Shaffer. See Thomas
L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics ofRadical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963 (1987). Grounding
his views in his Christian faith, Professor Shaffer categorically rejects the value of individual
autonomy. His central thesis is that, in a family, the role to be played by each member is
preordained by external authority, and to that authority the individual in the family must
submit. However, within the confines of that ground rule, the individual family member must
decide for himself or herself how to be the assigned role. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary
M. Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto as a Virtue in the Tradition of Italian-
American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838, 839 (1989) ("We choose because of where
we belong, we do not choose where to belong.").
Another proponent of the communitarian view is Russell Pearce, though his advocacy is far
more qualified than Shaffer's. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics:
Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253
(1994). Pearce does recognize individuality within families in that he would have family
members choose, as individuals, whether they wish to give up their individuality and have their
family be represented as a unitary entity. See id. at 1294-95. Moreover, any individual family
member could drop out of the group at any time and seek separate representation. However,
once they make the choice for entity representation, the lawyer would treat the family as an
"organization" is treated under Model Rule 1.13. See id. at 1312-13. Under that Rule, the
organization is presumed to be hierarchical, and the lawyer ultimately looks to the "highest
authority that can act in behalf of the organization"--prototypically, a corporate board of
directors-to determine the needs, preferences, and interests of the entire entity. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.13 (1995). A lawyer who applies Rule 1.13 to a
family thus treats it as if it were structured patriarchally, with a "highest authority" having the
last word in dealing with the lawyer.
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unto itself, would be considered the client, the lawyer would not necessarily
inquire into the interests or desires of individual family members as such.
Instead, her singular focus would be on determining what is in the best interest
of the family entity. 9 Presumably, she would make that determination by a
combination of talking to family members and relying on her own experience,
common sense, and sound judgment. In representing the family as an entity,
moreover, the lawyer would not be required to maintain the confidentiality of
individual family members' communications. Thus, whatever is revealed by one
family member would ordinarily be shared with all.
Rollock fully appreciates the communitarian insight that people do exist in
relationships, such as families, with shared goals and common interests.
However, she rejects as unrealistic the conclusion that family businesses should
therefore be viewed as "black box" entities, in which family members'
individuality is not recognized. She argues, first, that the relationships within
families are not static. They change over time, by divorce and remarriage, for
example.2" Thus, the family changes as its individual members change, and a
lawyer cannot understand the dynamics of a family business without
understanding the individuals who comprise it. That requires going beyond a
view of the family as an entity unto itself. Second, viewing the family business
as an entity precludes the lawyer from recognizing disagreements among family
members. As a result, decisions purportedly made by and for the family may
actually reflect the preferences of the dominant family member, or the lawyer's
own opinion of what is good for the family.2
Rollock also rejects a strictly contractualist view of family business
representation. Her objection to this view is that it, too, distorts the reality of
family relationships. The contractualist view treats each family member as an
autonomous individual who has his or her own separate, individualized
relationship with the family lawyer. This means that it is up to each family
member to establish a lawyer-client relationship with the family lawyer by some
sort of purposeful action.' Any family member who fails to act individually in
this manner will not be deemed a client. For Rollock, this emphasis on family
members' individual initiative ignores the reality of how family members behave.
In particular, family members who take a passive or subordinated role with
respect to business matters may not be able to establish their own independent
relationship with the family-business lawyer, and may believe that the other
family members will protect their interests.' The contractualist view would leave
these persons without representation. As a result, in the event of a dispute, they
would find themselves without a champion just when they need one most.
Having rejected the communitarian and contractualist approaches to family
representation, Rollock crafts a reasonable-expectations approach that seeks to
make use of aspects of both of the former approaches. It recognizes that, within
19. See Rollock, supra note I, at 580-83.
20. See id at 582.
21. See id.
22. See id at 583-84.
23. See id at 584.
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families, tasks are often allotted in such a way as to. create special
interdependencies. A couple may decide that they do not both need to meet with
the lawyer to set up their new business, and that the husband can attend to that
chore alone. That should not necessarily mean that they do not both have a real,
cognizable stake in the business. The wife, even though she never lays eyes on
the lawyer-indeed, even though she fails to affirmatively assert her ownership
interest in the business-will often nonetheless expect the lawyer to be serving
her interests as well as her husband's. According to Rollock, such an expectation
would be reasonable.24 The lawyer should be ethically required to recognize it as
such, and to respond accordingly.
Rollock elaborates on the claim that such expectations are reasonable by
developing a concept of implicit ownership of a family business. An explicit
interest, according to Rollock, arises from either legal title or equitable notions
of beneficial ownership.' An implicit interest in a family business, on the other
hand, arises out of arrangements that do not necessarily trigger equitable-
ownership rules.26 The most compelling example of an implicit interest arises
when family assets are used to fund start-up costs and/or ongoing operating
expenses of the family business. In such a situation, even if one spouse-the
husband, for example-legally owns the business and the wife has neither a legal
nor a cognizable equitable claim to it, the wife may nonetheless expect that,
because family assets went into the business, the business itself is a shared
family enterprise. As such, she may expect that the family-business lawyer is
representing her interests no less than her husband's.27
Rollock asserts that this implicit-ownership expectation also occurs when the
wife cosigns personal guarantees of the business's debt, or consents to
mortgaging the family home to secure such a debt, even if such acts do not give
her a legally cognizable interest in the business.28 Rollock reasons that in making
these contributions to the business, the wife is not merely making a gratuitous
gift to her husband.29 Rather, she makes that investment in the expectation of
sharing in the success of the business. In other words, family members-perhaps
especially husbands and wives-reasonably understand their relationship as a
pooling of resources and a sharing of the wealth produced by that pooling of
resources. In such an economically interdependent relationship, an implicit
ownership expectation simply reflects the reality that each spouse's "economic
welfare depends, at least in part, on the other spouse's wealth."3 A concomitant
to this reality is that the implicit owner of the business expects her interests to be
represented by the family-business lawyer. Rollock maintains that the family-
business lawyer should be ethically bound to recognize this expectation.
Rollock's reasonable-expectations approach to intermediation is persuasive to
me for two reasons. First, it echoes the "reasonable expectations" model that
24. See id at 586.
25. See id. at 571.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 572.
28. See id. at 571,
29. See id. at 572.
30. Id. at 571.
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applies in the context of closely held corporations-the preferred organizational
form for many family businesses. In closely held corporations, owner-managers'
fiduciary duties prohibit them from acting in such a way as to frustrate the
reasonable expectations of their fellow owners.3 Rollock expands on this notion
somewhat in that she advocates recognizing implicit ownership of family-
businesses. The fiduciary-duty rules developed for close corporations protect
only actual shareholders of the corporations.32 By contrast, Rollock calls on the
family-business lawyer to respect the reasonable expectations of those family
members who are implicit owners of the business, albeit not actually
shareholders or partners. 3 This expansion is entirely appropriate. The close-
corporation fiduciary-duty rules were crafted specifically because of the special
vulnerability of noncontrolling (thus, in a sense, silenced) owners of such
businesses.34 The dynamics of family life, in which one or more of the family
members are often expected to keep silent about business matters, create an
analogous kind of special vulnerability. That they keep silent does not mean they
should be overlooked. Indeed, because their silence may indicate vulnerability,
the family lawyer should explore and clarify their expectations at the outset of
the representation. This is what Rollock's approach requires.
In addition, Rollock's reasonable-expectations approach, it seems to me, best
captures the practical reality of family businesses in that it affirms that such
enterprises embrace both communitarian and individualist ethics. Much as we
may find it jarring to recognize, a family business is both a family and a business.
Moreover, it is not a little bit family and a little bit business. It is fully both. It
harbors all the complex emotions, and emotional baggage, of families. At the
same time, its members engage in the day-to-day activities of running a business
for corporate and personal gain. By contrast, the communitarian and
contractualist models of Model Rule 2.2 interpretation each ultimately rely on
one-sided visions of a family, both of which are unworkable in the face of the
complex reality of family businesses.
The legal profession needs to be able to accept that the individual members in
a family business are, and legitimately ought to be, self-serving. That is the
accepted norm for coowners of close corporations; their fiduciary duty to respect
one another's reasonable expectations operates as a check on their basic right of
31. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); see
also In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
32. See cases cited supra note 31. See generally 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESsION OF MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS § 4:07 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1997).
33. See Rollock, supra note 1, at 584-86.
34. The special vulnerability exists because minority shareholders of close corporations
have neither an effective voice in decisionmaking within the entity, nor a viable means of
leaving it. They cannot divest themselves of their interest in the firm when relations with their
fellow shareholders turn sour because they have neither an organized market into which to sell
their shares nor a statutory right to dissolve the entity. That makes them unique-unlike
shareholders of publicly traded corporations, who can sell their shares into an organized
market, and unlike partners, who can dissolve the partnership. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d
657.
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selfish ownership.35 Partnership law and the law of other closely held businesses
(especially in recent codifications) also recognize the fundamental right of
coowners to advance their own selfish interests, albeit within the limits of their
fiduciary duties. 6
At the same time, in that the business partners are also family, the legal
community ought to acknowledge their affective ties and accept that they have
an important stake in being able to maintain those bonds over the long term. As
a practical matter, whatever happens to their business, the family members will
continue for their entire lives to meet at weddings, funerals, graduations, and
other family reunions. They are not merely strangers interacting at arms' length.
Practicality, moreover, is not the only reason family members seek to maintain
strong relationships. Another reason is that, in reality, family-member business
partners are not motivated* solely by their own selfishness, constrained only by
the externalized force of fiduciary obligation. Quite the contrary. Their desire to
pursue their own ends coexists with their affection for one another. Thus, they
also want to further one another's ends, and not so much out of legal duty as out
of love." Their lawyers need to understand this.
More specifically, family-business lawyers need to understand the complexity
of the intentions and goals of family members in a family business. In general,
family members may want their relationships to be structured to strike a balance
among four considerations. First, each individual family member has economic
rights that deserve to be protected, and that she should be entitled to advance.
35. An example of a corporate shareholder's basic right of selfish ownership may be found
in Tryon v. Smith, 229 P.2d 251 (Or. 1951), where a controlling shareholder was held entitled
to sell his control block to a purchaser for a premium over the price offered to the minority
shareholders. Thus, he was permitted to use his position of control to his own benefit, even if
this disadvantaged the other shareholders.
36. The scope and nature of fiduciary duties concerning joint owners of partnerships,
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies have been highly controversial recently.
Traditionally, fiduciary duties in partnerships (as well as corporations) have been a matter of
judge-made law and have been couched in extremely expansive terms. See Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one
another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty."). However, the 1994
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, as well as the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, both
purport to limit partners' and managers' fiduciary duties to the specific terms laid out in those
statutes. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 409 (1995); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsHnP ACT § 404
(1994). The narrow statutory formulation of coowners' fiduciary duties clearly envisions that
on numerous issues owners may treat one another as strangers bargaining at arms-length with
each concerned for his own personal gain. For critiques of these statutory attempts to restrict
fiduciary duties, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate
Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REv.
111 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure
Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994: Is the
Contractarian Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1559 (1995).
37. For a discussion of this theme with respect to owners of closely held firms generally,
see O'Neill, supra note 5. While I reject the myth that love and altruism are all that exist in
family relations, these qualities are surely no less present in family businesses than in other
closely held firms.
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Second, relatedly, each family member has an obligation to respect the individual
rights of each of the others. Third, beyond this duty to respect others' rights,
which applies even among strangers, family members are bound by love. They
express their love for one another by affirmatively seeking to respond to each
other's wants and preferences. Although this makes them vulnerable to one
another, the fact that they do love each other should not be permitted to
overwhelm their right to have their interests protected. Fourth, family members
also have a sense of the family business as an entity unto itself, with its own
interest in thriving through future generations, and they want to promote that
interest as such.
The communitarian approach to family representation does a good job of
capturing the fourth consideration listed above (the entity aspect of the family
business), but ignores the first three. The contractualist approach recognizes the
first consideration (that each family member is an autonomous individual), but
fails to grasp the last three. By contrast, Rollock's reasonable-expectations
approach calls on lawyers to broaden their understanding of the dynamics of
family businesses, and to respond to the actual reality of their clients' lives.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING FAMILY RELATIONS
Rollock convincingly demonstrates that, when lawyers are asked to represent
family businesses, neither the communitarian nor the contractualist approach to
representing families gives adequate guidance. In this final section, I suggest that
it is not only family businesses that are ill-served by the communitarian and
contractualist visions of intermediation. I suggest these models may also be
inadequate to guide family lawyers, even with respect to nonbusiness family
matters, because they rely on skewed visions of familial relations.
The communitarian model of family representation, by insisting that the family
be viewed only as a unitary entity, treats individual family members as if they
have no independent existence and no legitimate interest distinct from the family
group. 8 This is not how people actually experience their own families. In reality,
we never shed our individuality even though it is also true that we exist in
families, as we live in many other overlapping communities (communities of
work, of faith, of neighborhood, to name a few). What, then, accounts for the
communitarian suppression of family members' individual autonomy? One
explanation lies in the family/market dichotomy to which I alluded earlier?9 That
is, an unspoken premise underlying the communitarian approach may be that in
an idealized family, altruism, sharing, and sacrifice reign supreme, whereas
38. This is true in both Shaffer's extreme stance that individual autonomy destroys the
integrity of families, see Shaffer, supra note 18, at 968-71, as well as in more moderate
versions of the communitarian model. For example, Pearce recognizes that individual members
of families are autonomous persons, but his proposal is that, once the family group has chosen
to be treated as an entity, then the lawyer is thrown back on the principle of Model Rule 1.13
and must treat the individual family members as strangers to her client, the family group. See
Pearce, supra note 18, at 1294-314. Thus, individual family members' interests would not be
permitted to come into play in the lawyer's representation of the family.
39. See supra notes 4-14.
1998]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
individualism is a trait reserved for an idealized "market." On that view,
individual family members should want to suppress their own self-interest for the
good of family unity and prosperity. Only weakness of character drives them to
assert their own interests as individuals. Accordingly, the lawyer who ignores or
suppresses the personal agenda of individual family members would simply be
doing what the individual .family members want (or should want) her to do.
Similar observations may be made about the contractualist model of family
intermediation. By insisting that each individual family member must
autonomously and affirmatively seek the lawyer's services in order for the lawyer
to owe her any consideration at all, the contractualist model ignores the reality
that some family members are silenced or subordinated.40 Not all of them are
equally able to assert their own self-interest in dealing with their loved ones. Yet,
the contractualist model treats them as if they were, and denies representation to
those who fail to meet its standard of autonomy and self-protection. The
explanation for this counterfactual stance may lie, again, in the family/market
dichotomy. Within the logic of this dichotomy, if a relationship is cast as one
between autonomous individuals, then it must be a "market-like" relationship. As
such, ideally, each individual should negotiate with the others at arms' length in
an equal competition for personal advantage. Any person who makes sacrifices
for the good of others or of the group is a less-than-ideal competitor. Viewed in
this light, such a person can, indeed should, be penalized because her altruism
is seen as illegitimate in individualist, market-like relations.
Thus, what is shared in common between the communitarian and the
contractualist models of family lawyering may be more important than that which
divides them. Though they seem to offer utterly opposing approaches, they are,
nonetheless, united in adhering to the myth of family/market opposition. If that
myth is false, as I claim it is, the foundation on which both approaches are built
is seriously undermined. Some new approach, not beholden to the false
dichotomy of family-versus-market, is needed for effective family representation.
It seems to me that Rollock's reasonable-expectations model moves us in that
direction. Ideally, it will offer a means by which family lawyers can proceed with
heightened sensitivity to the needs of their clients.
To be sure, some families may be highly egalitarian. In that case, the
contractualist assumption that any family members who do not speak up do not
want or expect to be represented, may well hold. By the same token, some
families may be extremely patriarchal. In that case, the communitarian
assumption that, when the dominant family member speaks he speaks for the
family and all of its members, may also hold. By far most families, however, fall
somewhere in the middle. For them the communitarian and contractualist models
of representation, each in its own way, would do more harm than good. I suggest
they would be better served by a family lawyer who, in accordance with the
reasonable-expectations approach, asks specific questions about the
40. Notwithstanding our commitment to political equality for all persons, families remain
sites of steeply hierarchical relations. In part, that may be because legal recognition of equality
within families is thought to entail too much state intervention into the privacy of the family.
See Olsen, supra note 4, at 1505.
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particularized dynamics of the family she is being asked to represent. I think it
is also fair to hope that, by engaging in that kind of inquiry, the legal community
may come to relinquish the family/market dichotomy and become sensitized to
the complex interplay of selfishness and altruism, competitiveness and sacrifice,
that pertains in most families.

